Marla Crawford v. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. et al

Holding: In *Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements containing class-action waivers, ruling that such waivers do not conflict with the National Labor Relations Act's protection of employees' rights to engage in concerted activity.

Argument: The defendant side is arguing that the employment agreement between Marla Crawford and Goldman Sachs contains a valid mandatory individual arbitration clause with a class-action waiver, which must be enforced under the FAA as mandated by *Epic Systems*, thereby preventing Crawford from pursuing her claims as part of a collective or class action lawsuit.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Epic Systems* specifically addressed labor relations and the NLRA, suggesting that its broad enforcement of class waivers might not extend to non-labor contexts or specific consumer protection statutes where public policy concerns differ. Furthermore, the defense could challenge whether the specific arbitration provision in the Crawford contract was procedurally unconscionable or if it falls under a statutory exception (such as the FAA's "seamen" or "transportation worker" exemption) that *Epic Systems* did not explicitly resolve for this specific type of financial services dispute.

Holding: In *Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams*, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption for "contracts of employment" applies only to workers engaged in interstate transportation (such as seamen, railroad workers, and truck drivers) and not to all employees, thereby enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses in standard employment contracts for non-transportation workers.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that under *Circuit City*, Marla Crawford's employment contract with Goldman Sachs contains a valid, enforceable mandatory arbitration clause that precludes her from pursuing her claims in court, as she is an employee in a financial sector role rather than a transportation worker excluded by the FAA's narrow exemption.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that while *Circuit City* broadly enforces arbitration clauses, it does not address specific unconscionability issues or procedural defects unique to this case, such as whether the arbitration agreement was signed under duress or if the forum selection clause is fundamentally unfair given the power imbalance between a massive corporation and an individual employee. Furthermore, the defense might distinguish the case by noting that *Circuit City* did not resolve whether the specific arbitration provisions at issue here violate state public policy or statutory rights that survive the FAA's preemptive scope, potentially allowing the plaintiff to challenge the clause on grounds unrelated to the general "employment" definition.

Holding: In *Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd*, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires federal courts to compel arbitration of claims subject to an arbitration agreement, even when those claims are joined with non-arbitrable claims in a single lawsuit, and that district courts lack discretion to stay the arbitrable portion pending resolution of the non-arbitrable portion.

Argument: The defendant side is likely arguing that under the mandate of *Byrd*, Marla Crawford's case must be compelled into arbitration for any claims covered by her employment or account agreements, regardless of whether she has asserted other non-arbitrable claims against Goldman Sachs, thereby preventing the court from keeping the entire case in litigation while other issues are resolved.

Counter: An opposing counsel could argue that *Byrd* applies strictly to the procedural mechanism of severing arbitrable claims, but does not address substantive defenses such as unconscionability, fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, or public policy exceptions that might render the entire agreement unenforceable. Furthermore, if the "non-arbitrable" claims in the current case are so intertwined with the arbitrable ones that they share a common core of facts, the opposing side could distinguish *Byrd* by asserting that the specific factual matrix here necessitates a unified judicial determination to avoid inconsistent rulings, a nuance not fully explored in the rigid statutory interpretation of *Byrd*.

Holding: In *Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto*, the Supreme Court held that state laws invalidating arbitration agreements based on specific formatting requirements (such as requiring them to be in all capital letters) are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which mandates that arbitration clauses be enforced according to their terms and general contract principles.

Argument: The defendant is arguing that any state law or judicial rule in Montana (or the relevant jurisdiction) that attempts to invalidate Marla Crawford's arbitration agreement due to a technical defect—such as font size, placement, or lack of specific bolding—is preempted by the FAA and therefore unenforceable, thereby compelling the court to enforce the arbitration clause despite these alleged procedural flaws.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Casarotto* only preempts state laws that single out arbitration for special scrutiny; if the formatting requirement at issue applies generally to all contracts under state law rather than targeting arbitration specifically, the FAA may not preempt it. Furthermore, the defense might contend that the FAA does not protect arbitration agreements formed through fraud, duress, or unconscionability, so if the formatting defect renders the agreement fundamentally unfair or hidden from the consumer, the court should still refuse enforcement based on general contract defenses rather than state-specific arbitration statutes.

Holding: In *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies in state court proceedings and preempts state laws that invalidate arbitration clauses in employment contracts, thereby enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements even when state statutes provide broader protections to employees.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) is arguing that the FAA mandates the enforcement of the arbitration agreement signed by Marla Crawford, overriding any conflicting California state law provisions (likely referencing the specific "Keating" context of the Private Attorneys General Act or similar consumer/employee protection statutes) that might otherwise allow her to pursue claims in court rather than through arbitration.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Southland* has been significantly narrowed or distinguished by subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence, such as *Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis* or *Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela*, which may limit its application to specific contexts like class action waivers or individualized arbitration rather than broad statutory rights. Furthermore, if the underlying claim involves a specific federal statute that explicitly excludes arbitration (a rare but possible scenario) or if the plaintiff argues that the arbitration clause itself was unconscionable under general contract principles independent of the state statute preempted in *Southland*, the citation's force would be diminished. Finally, the defense must ensure the case does not involve a specific exception where the Supreme Court later clarified that certain state regulatory interests regarding public policy remain intact despite the FAA's broad reach.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not permit states to invalidate arbitration agreements based on a "clearly erroneous" standard of review or by applying rules that single out arbitration for special scrutiny, thereby requiring courts to treat arbitration agreements like any other contract under state law.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that the court must enforce the arbitration clause in the Crawford case without applying heightened scrutiny or invalidating it based on specific state procedural rules that might otherwise favor the plaintiff's claim, relying on *Kindred* to assert that the FAA preempts any state rule that discriminates against arbitration.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Kindred* only prohibits discrimination against arbitration itself, not the application of generally applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability if those defenses are applied neutrally to all contracts regardless of their arbitral nature. Furthermore, the plaintiff might distinguish the case by asserting that the specific provision being challenged does not target arbitration but rather addresses a fundamental flaw in the formation of the agreement that would render any contract voidable, thus falling outside the scope of *Kindred*'s preemption protection.

Holding: In *Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.*, the New York Court of Appeals held that a broker-dealer's duty to supervise its employees under NYSE rules does not create an independent private right of action for investors; rather, such duties are regulatory obligations enforceable only by the exchange or regulators, not by individual plaintiffs in civil suits for damages.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) is likely arguing that Marla Crawford cannot assert a claim based on the firm's failure to supervise its employees because, under *Fletcher*, such supervisory duties do not give rise to a private cause of action for breach of contract or negligence against the brokerage firm itself.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that while *Fletcher* bars a direct claim for "failure to supervise" as an independent tort, it does not preclude liability if the plaintiff can prove that the specific employee's misconduct was committed with actual knowledge or reckless disregard by senior management, thereby establishing a separate basis for vicarious liability or fraud. Furthermore, the court might argue that *Fletcher* addressed specific NYSE rule violations in a different factual context and should not be broadly applied to bar claims where the alleged failure to supervise constitutes a fundamental breach of fiduciary duty distinct from mere regulatory non-compliance.

Holding: In *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) "commerce clause" jurisdictional reach extends to any transaction affecting interstate commerce, including purely intrastate transactions with a substantial connection to interstate commerce, thereby rejecting a narrower interpretation of the FAA's scope.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that the FAA mandates the enforcement of an arbitration agreement in this case because the underlying dispute involves a transaction that affects interstate commerce, and under *Allied-Bruce*, the federal court has jurisdiction to compel arbitration regardless of whether the specific transaction was local or national in nature.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that while *Allied-Bruce* broadly defines the FAA's jurisdictional reach, it does not automatically validate every arbitration clause; the defendant must still demonstrate that the specific contract at issue contains a valid, enforceable arbitration provision that was knowingly agreed upon by the plaintiff. Furthermore, the counter-argument could emphasize that *Allied-Bruce* addresses the threshold question of federal jurisdiction over the subject matter, not the substantive validity of the arbitration clause itself, which may be challenged on grounds of unconscionability or lack of mutual assent independent of the commerce clause analysis.

Holding: In *Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*, the Supreme Court held that a state court's determination of whether a contract involves interstate commerce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is a question of federal law for the court to decide, not a factual question for a jury, and that the "stream of commerce" test applies broadly to determine if an activity affects interstate commerce.

Argument: The defendant side likely cites this case to argue that the issue of whether the underlying dispute in *Crawford* falls within the scope of the FAA (and thus mandates arbitration) is a matter of federal law to be decided by the judge, rather than a factual dispute requiring a jury trial, or to support a broad interpretation of "interstate commerce" to encompass the financial services activities of Goldman Sachs.

Counter: An opposing counsel could distinguish this citation by arguing that while *Alafabco* establishes the standard for defining interstate commerce, it does not resolve the specific threshold issue of whether the parties' agreement contains a valid, enforceable arbitration clause covering the specific claims at hand. Furthermore, the opponent might challenge the application of the "stream of commerce" test by asserting that the specific conduct alleged against Goldman Sachs in *Crawford* is purely local or intrastate in nature, thereby falling outside the scope of the FAA regardless of the bank's general business operations.

Holding: The court in *In re the Arbitration between Teleserve Systems, Inc. & MCI Telecommunications Corp.* affirmed that a party's failure to timely move to vacate an arbitration award on specific grounds constitutes a waiver of those grounds, reinforcing the strict statutory timelines and finality requirements under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 75.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that Marla Crawford waived her right to challenge specific procedural or substantive aspects of the arbitration process because she failed to raise them within the mandatory timeframe for seeking to vacate the award, thereby barring her current claims against Goldman Sachs.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this case by arguing that Crawford's current motion does not seek to "vacate" the award based on grounds previously raised, but rather addresses a distinct legal issue—such as fraud, corruption, or a fundamental public policy violation—that was not subject to the same waiver rules or arose after the original deadline. Furthermore, if the underlying dispute involves a class action or a systemic issue affecting non-parties to the original arbitration, the strict waiver principles applied in *Teleserve* may not apply with the same force to prevent judicial review of the agreement's validity itself.

Holding: *Cusimano v. Schnurr* (26 N.Y.3d 391) established that a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) before filing a civil action constitutes a complete bar to the lawsuit, and such a defect cannot be cured by amending the complaint after the statute of limitations has expired.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's claims are subject to dismissal because she failed to properly exhaust her administrative remedies with the Division of Human Rights prior to initiating this litigation, rendering her complaint legally insufficient regardless of any subsequent attempts to cure the defect.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that *Cusimano* applies strictly to cases where the exhaustion requirement was never attempted or was fundamentally defective, whereas Crawford may have engaged in a good-faith attempt at mediation or filed a timely notice of claim that merely lacked specific procedural formalities which can be cured under CPLR 305-a. Furthermore, if the underlying facts suggest that the administrative process was futile or that the agency explicitly waived the exhaustion requirement, the strict bar applied in *Cusimano* might not apply to prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over the substantive claims.

Holding: In *Chimart Associates v. Paul*, the New York Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must prove that the corporation was used as a mere instrumentality or alter ego for fraud, illegality, or injustice, and that the defendant exercised such complete domination over the corporation that it had no separate will of its own.

Argument: The defendant side is likely arguing that under the standard set forth in *Chimart*, Marla Crawford has failed to meet the high burden required to hold Goldman Sachs or its affiliates liable for the actions of another entity (or vice versa) by demonstrating that the corporate form was abused to perpetrate a fraud or injustice, thereby insulating the named defendants from liability.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Chimart* specifically addresses the "alter ego" doctrine in the context of contract disputes and general corporate separateness, whereas this case may involve distinct statutory claims or specific fiduciary duties where the veil-piercing standard differs or is not the primary legal issue. Furthermore, if the current litigation involves allegations of direct misconduct by Goldman Sachs employees rather than the misuse of a subsidiary's corporate structure, the strict instrumentalities test from *Chimart* may be legally irrelevant to the core facts of the claim.

Holding: In *Diamond Waterproofing Systems, Inc. v. 55 Liberty Owners Corp.*, the New York Court of Appeals held that a general contractor's duty to indemnify and defend under a contract is strictly limited by the express language of that agreement and does not extend to cover the indemnitee's own negligence unless the contract explicitly states such an intent.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) likely cites this case to argue that any contractual obligation to indemnify or defend Marla Crawford must be interpreted narrowly; specifically, they are asserting that if the relevant agreements do not contain explicit, unambiguous language stating that Goldman Sachs assumes liability for its own negligence or specific types of misconduct, no such duty exists under New York law.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that the specific employment or engagement agreements in *Crawford* contain broader "broad form" indemnity clauses or statutory mandates (such as those under the Labor Law) that differ from the commercial construction context of *Diamond*. Furthermore, the defense could challenge the application of *Diamond* by contending that the court should look beyond the strict textual interpretation of indemnity to consider public policy arguments regarding fiduciary duties or the specific nature of the alleged misconduct, which may override standard contractual limitations.

Holding: In *Wabtec Corp. v. Faiveley Transport Malmo AB*, the Second Circuit held that a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) bears the burden of proving that the arbitrator exceeded their powers, and that such an excess must be demonstrated by showing the arbitrator ignored the express terms of the agreement rather than merely misinterpreting them.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's challenge to the arbitration award fails because she cannot demonstrate that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" within the meaning of the FAA; specifically, they are asserting that any alleged errors in the arbitration process amount to mere misinterpretations of the contract or facts, which are not valid grounds for vacatur under the standard set forth in *Wabtec*.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Wabtec* does not preclude vacatur if the arbitrators acted in "manifest disregard of the law," a distinct ground where the arbitrators knew the applicable legal rule but intentionally ignored it, which differs from a simple error of interpretation. Furthermore, the plaintiff might contend that the specific conduct in this case involved the arbitrators deciding issues completely outside the scope of the submission agreement, thereby constituting a true "excess of powers" rather than a permissible interpretation of ambiguous terms.

Holding: In *Cusimano v. Schnurr*, the New York Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff's failure to serve a notice of claim within the statutory timeframe constitutes a jurisdictional bar that cannot be waived or excused by equitable tolling, even in cases involving alleged municipal negligence.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's claim (or a related procedural defect) is similarly barred because she failed to strictly adhere to a mandatory notice-of-claim requirement or a similar jurisdictional deadline, asserting that the court lacks the authority to hear the case regardless of any equitable arguments regarding delay or hardship.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by demonstrating that the current case does not involve a "notice of claim" against a municipality, but rather a private corporate dispute where such strict jurisdictional bars do not apply under New York law. Furthermore, if the issue involves a statute of limitations rather than a notice of claim, the court might find that equitable tolling or other saving statutes are available, which were explicitly rejected in *Cusimano* only in the specific context of municipal liability. Finally, the opponent could argue that the factual circumstances of Crawford's case involve different parties and legal theories that fall outside the narrow holding regarding municipal defendants established in *Cusimano*.

Holding: In *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson*, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) "commerce clause" power extends to any transaction affecting interstate commerce, thereby preempting state laws that invalidate arbitration clauses in contracts involving purely intrastate activities if those activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that under the broad interpretation of the FAA established in *Allied-Bruce*, the arbitration agreement in this case must be enforced regardless of any state law restrictions or public policy arguments raised by Marla Crawford, as the underlying transaction falls within the scope of federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that while *Allied-Bruce* expanded the definition of "commerce," it did not eliminate all state protections for consumers; specifically, they might contend that the specific state law at issue here addresses unconscionability or fundamental fairness rather than merely regulating the scope of the FAA, which remains permissible under the Supreme Court's later precedents like *AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion*. Furthermore, the opponent could distinguish the facts by asserting that the specific contract in *Marla Crawford* lacks the necessary nexus to interstate commerce required to trigger the FAA's preemption, or that the arbitration clause itself contains procedural defects that render it unenforceable independent of the commerce clause analysis.

Holding: In *Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*, the Supreme Court held that a state court's determination of whether a transaction is "in connection with" interstate commerce under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) must be made by applying federal law, not state law, and that the FAA preempts state laws attempting to limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements in such contexts.

Argument: The defendant side cites this case to argue that any state-law defenses or procedural hurdles raised by Marla Crawford regarding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement must yield to federal law under the FAA, thereby compelling the court to compel arbitration regardless of specific state statutory interpretations or public policy arguments.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that *Alafabco* specifically addresses the scope of the FAA's "interstate commerce" requirement rather than the substantive validity of the arbitration clause itself; if Crawford's challenge relies on a fundamental defect like fraud in the inducement or unconscionability unique to the contract formation, state common law principles may still apply to those specific factual inquiries. Furthermore, the opponent might contend that the current case involves a consumer employment dispute where specific state statutes (like California's Private Attorneys General Act or similar wage laws) create a distinct regulatory framework that the Supreme Court has previously suggested may not be fully preempted if the arbitration provision effectively waives statutory rights entirely.

Holding: In *Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown*, the Supreme Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a nursing home admission contract is not unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) simply because it involves claims arising from personal injury or death, rejecting state public policy arguments against such waivers.

Argument: The defendant side argues that the plaintiff's claims against Goldman Sachs must be compelled to arbitration pursuant to the FAA, asserting that any state law or public policy concerns regarding the nature of the dispute (e.g., securities fraud or employment issues) cannot override the federal mandate to enforce valid pre-dispute arbitration clauses.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this case by arguing that *Marmet* specifically addressed nursing home admission contracts and personal injury claims, whereas the Crawford case involves complex securities litigation where specific statutory exemptions or unconscionability doctrines unique to financial services might render the clause unenforceable. Furthermore, the counter-argument would emphasize that *Marmet* did not address situations where the arbitration clause itself was procured through fraud, duress, or where the cost of arbitration effectively prevents the vindication of federal statutory rights, which are distinct factual scenarios from the nursing home context.

Holding: *Moore v. Microsoft Corp.* (2002) was a motion to dismiss where the court held that an employee's claim for breach of contract based on an employee handbook was barred because the handbook explicitly stated it did not create contractual rights and that employment was at-will.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that, similar to *Moore*, Marla Crawford's claims against Goldman Sachs are barred because her employment agreement or any relevant company policies explicitly disclaimed the creation of contractual obligations or affirmed the at-will nature of her employment.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by noting that *Moore* turned on specific, unambiguous disclaimer language in the handbook which may be absent or ambiguous in the Goldman Sachs documents at issue. Furthermore, if Crawford's case involves statutory violations (such as discrimination or retaliation) rather than pure contract interpretation, the *Moore* precedent regarding the non-creation of contractual rights would be legally irrelevant to those distinct causes of action.

Holding: *Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc.* held that a plaintiff's assertion of standing based on the mere receipt of an unsolicited text message is insufficient to establish Article III injury-in-fact unless the plaintiff demonstrates a concrete harm or a specific risk of future harm beyond the statutory violation itself, particularly where the message was sent to a number the plaintiff voluntarily provided for a legitimate purpose.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) likely cites *Nicosia* to argue that Marla Crawford lacks standing because her alleged injury—receiving an unwanted communication—is purely technical and does not constitute a concrete harm under Article III, especially if she voluntarily provided her contact information or suffered no actual damages beyond the statutory penalty.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish *Nicosia* by arguing that the specific facts in *Crawford* involve a different context where the risk of harm is more acute, such as a violation of privacy rights regarding sensitive financial data rather than a general commercial text message. Furthermore, the court in *Crawford* might find that the statutory scheme creates a "concrete" injury simply through the violation of the right to be free from harassment, distinguishing it from *Nicosia* where the message was arguably less intrusive or the plaintiff had previously consented to similar communications. Finally, the counter-argument would emphasize that subsequent Supreme Court precedent (e.g., *Spokeo*) requires a case-by-case analysis of the nature of the statutory right violated, suggesting that a blanket application of *Nicosia* to dismiss all TCPA-style claims without examining the specific circumstances of the call or message is legally flawed.

Holding: In *Brijlall v. R.G. Ortiz Funeral Home, Inc.*, the Appellate Division affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a wrongful death action because the plaintiff failed to file the claim within the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-4.1, emphasizing that the limitation period is strictly enforced and not tolled by the defendant's conduct in this context.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) likely cites *Brijlall* to support an argument that statutory time limits for bringing claims are absolute and must be strictly adhered to, suggesting that if Marla Crawford's claims are time-barred or procedurally defective, they should be dismissed summarily without regard to equitable tolling or other mitigating factors.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish *Brijlall* by noting that it involved a specific statutory cause of action with a rigid, non-discretionary deadline under EPTL § 5-4.1, whereas the Crawford case may involve common law fraud or breach of fiduciary duty where the "discovery rule" or equitable estoppel might apply to delay the accrual of the claim. Furthermore, *Brijlall* did not address the complex interplay of corporate liability or the specific factual nuances of financial services litigation, making its application to Goldman Sachs' defense potentially overbroad if the underlying facts suggest the statute of limitations had not yet run due to concealment.

Holding: *Life Receivables Trust v. Goshawk Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's* held that under New York law, a party seeking to enforce an arbitration clause must demonstrate that the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement and that the party against whom enforcement is sought has agreed to arbitrate; specifically, it clarified that the "clear and unmistakable" evidence standard for delegating threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator applies only when the parties have explicitly agreed to such delegation in their contract.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) is likely arguing that because the parties' contract contains specific language or circumstances indicating a clear intent to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator (or conversely, that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement), the court should not decide the threshold issue of whether the dispute is arbitrable, but rather defer that determination to the arbitrator as mandated by the cited case's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act and New York common law.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Life Receivables* actually supports the plaintiff's position if the specific contract in *Crawford* lacks the explicit "clear and unmistakable" language required to delegate arbitrability questions to an arbitrator, thereby reserving that power for the court. Furthermore, the counter-argument would emphasize that *Life Receivables* distinguishes between disputes over the formation of the contract versus disputes over the scope of an existing agreement, suggesting that if Crawford challenges the very validity or existence of the arbitration clause itself, the court retains jurisdiction to decide that issue regardless of the general presumption favoring arbitration.

Holding: In *Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.*, the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant in a Title VII sexual harassment case, ruling that the plaintiff failed to establish a hostile work environment because her evidence of severe or pervasive conduct was insufficient and she did not exhaust administrative remedies regarding specific allegations.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) is likely citing this case to argue that Marla Crawford's claims fail as a matter of law due to a lack of sufficient evidence proving a hostile work environment or failure to meet procedural prerequisites, thereby seeking summary judgment on similar grounds.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish *Parisi* by highlighting factual differences in the severity and frequency of the alleged harassment in Crawford's case compared to the "insufficient" evidence found in *Parisi*. Furthermore, if Crawford properly exhausted administrative remedies or if the specific allegations in her complaint were not barred by the statute of limitations or scope of the EEOC charge, the procedural bar applied in *Parisi* would not apply here. Finally, the court in *Parisi* emphasized the plaintiff's subjective perception combined with an objective standard; if Crawford can demonstrate that the conduct was objectively severe enough to alter working conditions, the precedent does not mandate dismissal.

Holding: In *PricewaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. v. Rutlen*, the New York Appellate Division held that a limited liability company (LLC) member's right to inspect books and records is governed by the LLC agreement, and where the agreement grants broad inspection rights, the court may order an audit or detailed examination of financial records to enforce those rights without requiring a showing of "proper purpose" beyond the statutory default if the contract expands them.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) likely cites this case to argue that under New York law, the scope of a party's right to discover or inspect financial documents is strictly defined by the governing contract (the LLC agreement or operating agreement), and that if the agreement grants broad access, the plaintiff cannot be restricted by common law limitations or required to prove a specific "proper purpose" beyond what the contract stipulates.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by noting that *Rutlen* specifically involved the enforcement of explicit contractual language granting inspection rights in an LLC context, whereas the Crawford case may involve different legal relationships (such as employment or general partnership duties) where no such expansive contractual provision exists. Furthermore, even if a contract grants broad rights, the opposing counsel could argue that the discovery request in the current case exceeds the reasonable scope necessary to resolve the specific claims at hand, distinguishing it from the straightforward enforcement of a clear contractual mandate seen in *Rutlen*. Finally, the counter-argument could emphasize that *Rutlen* was decided in 2001 regarding LLC statutes, and subsequent case law or specific provisions in the Goldman Sachs agreements might impose stricter "proper purpose" requirements that limit the breadth of discovery compared to the holding in *Rutlen*.

Holding: In *Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow*, the New York Court of Appeals held that a broker-dealer's duty to supervise its registered representatives is non-delegable and that the firm can be held liable for the negligent supervision of employees who commit fraud, even if the specific fraudulent acts were not authorized by the firm.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) is likely arguing that under *Sacharow*, the standard for establishing liability for a financial institution regarding employee misconduct requires a showing of "negligent supervision" where the firm failed to detect or prevent known risks, implying that mere association with an employee's independent fraud is insufficient without proof of the firm's specific failure in its supervisory protocols.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Sacharow* actually establishes a broad, strict liability framework for broker-dealers regarding their employees' conduct, which undermines the defendant's attempt to limit liability to only instances of proven negligence in supervision. Furthermore, the plaintiff might distinguish the case by asserting that the specific facts in *Crawford* involve a pattern of willful blindness or systemic failures that go beyond the simple "negligence" threshold discussed in *Sacharow*, thereby triggering higher standards of vicarious liability under New York common law.

Holding: In *Stark v. Molod Spitz DeSantis & Stark, P.C.*, the New York Court of Appeals held that an attorney's duty of loyalty to a former client does not automatically extend to a current adversary in a separate matter unless there is a substantial relationship between the two cases or a specific conflict exists; the court clarified that general knowledge of a former client's affairs does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty absent a showing of actual prejudice or misuse of confidential information.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) likely cites *Stark* to argue that even if Marla Crawford was previously represented by the same law firm or individuals now representing her, or if she possesses general knowledge of Goldman Sachs' internal matters, such facts alone do not establish a legal basis for disqualification, liability, or a breach of duty without demonstrating a "substantial relationship" between the prior and current representations or specific evidence of misused confidential information.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish *Stark* by arguing that the specific facts in *Crawford* involve a direct conflict where the attorney or firm is actively litigating against a former client on substantially related issues, which *Stark* explicitly identified as a trigger for disqualification, unlike the more attenuated relationships discussed in *Stark*. Furthermore, the counter-argument would emphasize that *Stark* protects attorneys from automatic disqualification only when no prejudice is shown, whereas Crawford may be able to demonstrate that the mere appearance of impropriety or the specific nature of the confidential data at stake creates an irreparable harm that overrides the general rule established in *Stark*. Finally, the citing party may be misapplying *Stark* if the underlying issue in *Crawford* involves a statutory violation or a different fiduciary standard (such as under ERISA or specific banking regulations) that imposes stricter duties than the common law principles governing attorney-client conflicts addressed in *Stark*.

Holding: **HOLDING:** *Miller v. Miller*, 109 Misc. 2d 982 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981), held that a trial court has the inherent equitable power to award attorney's fees in a matrimonial action even in the absence of a specific statutory provision or contractual agreement, provided there is a showing of financial disparity and the necessity of such an award to ensure justice between the parties. **ARGUMENT_MADE:** The defendant side is likely arguing that under New York law, the court possesses broad eq

Holding: **HOLDING:** *Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.* established that federal courts must enforce arbitration agreements in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, emphasizing a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. **ARGUMENT_MADE:** The defendant is likely arguing that under the Supreme Court's mandate in *Cone*, the court must compel arbitration of

Holding: **HOLDING:** *Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft* (365 F.3d 144, 2d Cir. 2004) held that a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prior to filing suit constitutes a jurisdictional bar that cannot be waived or excused by equitable tolling, even if the defendant engaged in conduct intended to mislead the plaintiff about the need for such exhaustion. **ARGUMENT_MADE:** The defendant is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's claim

Holding: **HOLDING:** *Hayes v. County Bank* (1998) is a New York Supreme Court decision holding that a bank's failure to honor a customer's stop-payment order constitutes a breach of contract, but the plaintiff must prove actual damages resulting from that specific breach rather than relying on presumed damages or punitive measures absent fraud. **ARGUMENT_MADE:** The defendant side cites this case to argue that Marla Crawford cannot recover damages for alleged banking errors or procedural failures unl

Holding: **HOLDING:** In *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state laws that prohibit class-action waivers in arbitration agreements, thereby enforcing such waivers even when they prevent consumers from pursuing class-wide relief. **ARGUMENT_MADE:** The defendant side is likely arguing that the plaintiff's claims must be resolved through individual arbitration rather than a class action lawsuit, relying on *Concep

Holding: **HOLDING:** *National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Belco Petroleum Corp.*, 88 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 1996), held that a parent company's mere ownership of a subsidiary, even with significant control over its operations, is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter ego liability absent evidence of fraud, injustice, or the complete domination of the subsidiary such that it has no separate existence. **ARGUMENT_MADE:** The defendant side likely cites this case to argue that Goldman S

Holding: In *Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*, 539 U.S. 52 (2003), the Supreme Court held that a creditor's demand for payment of a debt in full before filing a bankruptcy petition does not constitute an "act of bankruptcy" under the former Bankruptcy Act, and more broadly, clarified that the definition of "debt" under the Bankruptcy Code includes contingent liabilities, rejecting the argument that only liquidated debts qualify.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that the plaintiff's claims or the nature of the alleged damages do not constitute a valid "debt" within the meaning of the relevant statute (potentially the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or a specific bankruptcy-related provision) because they are contingent, unliquidated, or disputed, and therefore cannot support the legal theory being advanced by the plaintiff.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this case by noting that *Alafabco* specifically addressed the scope of "debt" in the context of the Bankruptcy Code and the old Bankruptcy Act, whereas the Crawford litigation likely involves state law tort claims or federal consumer protection statutes where the definition of liability differs significantly from bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, the court in *Alafabco* explicitly rejected the notion that contingent claims are excluded from the definition of debt; thus, if the plaintiff's claim is merely disputed but not legally contingent in the same sense as a future event, the citation may actually undermine the defendant's attempt to dismiss the claim entirely based on its non-liquidated status.

Holding: The Court of Appeals held that a commercial general liability (CGL) policy's "expected or intended" exclusion precludes coverage for an insurer when the insured's conduct was intentional, even if the specific injury or damage resulting from that conduct was not specifically intended.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's claims arise from intentional misconduct by Goldman Sachs or its employees; therefore, under *Monarch*, any applicable insurance policies should be excluded from covering these claims because the alleged harm was the natural and probable consequence of intentional acts, regardless of whether the specific damages were foreseen.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by noting that *Monarch* involved a clear-cut case of intentional torts where the exclusion was explicitly triggered by the nature of the act itself, whereas Crawford's case may involve complex securities fraud or negligence claims where the "intentional" element is disputed or where the alleged harm was not the direct, intended result of the specific conduct. Furthermore, the court in *Monarch* emphasized the distinction between the intent to act and the intent to cause harm, suggesting that if Crawford's claims rely on negligent misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty rather than deliberate fraud, the strict application of the "expected or intended" exclusion might not apply as broadly as the defendant suggests.

Holding: In *Ayzenberg v. Bronx House Emanuel Campus, Inc.*, the Appellate Division affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff's negligence claim because the defendant hospital had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the criminal acts of a third party (a patient who attacked her), as there was no special relationship or prior specific threat that would have made such an attack foreseeable.

Argument: The defendant in *Crawford* is likely citing this case to argue that Goldman Sachs owes no duty of care to its employees or clients to prevent harm caused by third parties (such as harassment, violence, or criminal acts) unless there is a specific, known threat or a special relationship creating a heightened duty, thereby seeking to dismiss similar claims for lack of foreseeability or duty.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish *Ayzenberg* by arguing that the employment context at Goldman Sachs creates a distinct "special relationship" and statutory duties under New York labor laws and anti-discrimination statutes that do not exist between a hospital and a general visitor, imposing a higher affirmative duty to investigate and prevent workplace harassment or violence. Furthermore, if the *Crawford* case involves systemic issues like sexual harassment or a pattern of misconduct known to management, the argument that the harm was unforeseeable (the core holding of *Ayzenberg*) collapses, as knowledge of prior incidents creates a specific duty to act that distinguishes the facts from the isolated criminal act in *Ayzenberg*.

Holding: In *South Huntington Jewish Center, Inc. v. Heyman*, the Appellate Division affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a claim for breach of contract where the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that the defendant had actually received notice of the alleged breach or that the defendant's actions constituted a material violation of the agreement under the specific facts presented.

Argument: The defendants in *Crawford* are likely citing this case to argue that the plaintiff (Marla Crawford) has failed to meet her burden of proof regarding a critical element of her claim—such as providing adequate notice of a default, establishing a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the alleged harm, or proving the existence of a valid contractual obligation that was actually breached.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that *South Huntington* involved a straightforward commercial lease dispute with clear documentary evidence of non-performance, whereas the *Crawford* case involves complex securities fraud or employment discrimination claims where notice is often constructive or implied rather than explicit. Furthermore, the counter-argument would emphasize that *South Huntington* turned on a specific evidentiary gap regarding the receipt of notice, which may not be dispositive if the current case relies on statutory duties or fiduciary obligations that do not require the same type of formal notice to trigger liability. Finally, the distinction in the nature of the parties—a religious center versus a financial institution—could be used to argue that different standards of care and disclosure apply, rendering the procedural holding in *Heyman* inapplicable to the substantive allegations in *Crawford*.

Holding: In *Szabados v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.*, the New York Appellate Division held that an employer is not liable for a tortious injury sustained by an employee while commuting to or from work, as such travel does not arise out of and in the course of employment under Workers' Compensation Law principles.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) likely cites this case to argue that Marla Crawford's alleged injuries or claims are barred because they occurred outside the scope of her employment duties (e.g., during a commute or off-hours), thereby invoking the exclusive remedy doctrine of workers' compensation which precludes common law tort liability against the employer.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish *Szabados* by arguing that Crawford's activities at the time of the incident were not merely incidental to commuting but were specifically directed by the employer or occurred within the "special hazard" exception where the employer provided transportation or required the travel for business purposes. Furthermore, if the current case involves sexual harassment or hostile work environment claims rather than physical injury, the court may find that the *Szabados* commuting rule is inapplicable because such torts can occur within the workplace even if the specific act happened during a non-traditional work window, distinguishing the nature of the harm from the physical accident in *Szabados*.

Holding: *Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority* (2d Cir. 1998) held that a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or the relevant state tort claims act bars their claim, and specifically addressed the timeliness of filing an administrative claim as a jurisdictional prerequisite to litigation.

Argument: The defendant side is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's claims are procedurally barred because she failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies or missed the statutory deadline for filing an administrative claim prior to initiating this lawsuit, citing *Leibovitz* as controlling authority for the strict enforcement of these exhaustion requirements in cases involving government entities or similar liability frameworks.

Counter: The opposing side could argue that *Leibovitz* is factually distinguishable because it involved a direct suit against a government entity (NYC Transit Authority) where FTCA exhaustion was mandatory, whereas *Goldman Sachs* is a private corporate defendant where different procedural rules regarding notice and exhaustion apply. Furthermore, if Crawford's claims are based on securities fraud or employment discrimination rather than torts against a government body, the specific administrative exhaustion doctrine from *Leibovitz* may be legally inapplicable, rendering the citation a misapplication of law to the current facts.

Holding: In *Cellular Telephone Co. v. 210 East 86th Street Corp.*, the New York Supreme Court held that a commercial lease provision requiring a tenant to pay "all taxes" imposed on the leased premises does not automatically include real estate taxes levied against the landlord's ownership interest in the building, as distinct from taxes assessed specifically against the tenant's leasehold interest or the portion of the property occupied by the tenant.

Argument: The defendant (Goldman Sachs) is likely arguing that under established New York law, specific contractual language regarding tax obligations must be strictly construed; they are using this case to support a position that unless a lease or agreement explicitly and unambiguously states that a party assumes liability for the landlord's underlying ownership taxes (or general corporate taxes), such broad liability cannot be inferred from vague or general "tax" clauses, thereby attempting to limit their own exposure to specific, defined costs rather than general corporate liabilities.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by noting that *Cellular Telephone* dealt exclusively with the interpretation of a standard commercial lease clause regarding real property taxes, whereas the Crawford case involves allegations of securities fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or employment discrimination where "taxes" may refer to entirely different statutory liabilities or damages calculations unrelated to leasehold interests. Furthermore, the counter-argument would emphasize that *Cellular Telephone* was decided based on the specific text of a lease agreement, which is factually distinct from the complex statutory claims and class action mechanisms present in a securities litigation context, making the analogy between a landlord-tenant tax dispute and a corporate securities violation legally tenuous.

Holding: In *Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, the Second Circuit held that a user's agreement to an online "clickwrap" contract is enforceable only if the website provides reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms and the user manifests unambiguous assent to them; specifically, mere browsing or passive scrolling without an affirmative action (like clicking "I Agree") does not constitute binding consent to arbitration clauses.

Argument: The defendant side likely cites *Meyer* to argue that Marla Crawford did not validly agree to the arbitration clause in her employment or service agreement because she was not presented with reasonably conspicuous notice or did not perform an affirmative act manifesting assent, thereby rendering the arbitration provision unenforceable against her.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that unlike the passive browsing scenario in *Meyer*, Crawford's interaction with Goldman Sachs involved a specific, affirmative step (such as signing a physical document or clicking a distinct "I Agree" box) that clearly manifested assent to the terms, satisfying the *Meyer* standard for enforceability. Furthermore, the court could note that *Meyer* addressed a consumer app interface where terms were buried, whereas employment agreements often involve more formal execution processes that courts treat differently than digital clickwraps, potentially making the *Meyer* precedent less controlling in this specific factual context.

Holding: *Saheli v. White Memorial Medical Center* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 570 established that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must present expert testimony to establish the standard of care and causation, as these issues are beyond the common knowledge of laypersons, unless the negligence is so obvious that it falls under the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*.

Argument: The defendant side likely cites *Saheli* to argue that Marla Crawford's claims against Goldman Sachs fail because she has not provided sufficient expert testimony to prove that the financial institution breached a specific professional standard of care or that such breach caused her alleged damages, asserting that these complex financial matters are not within the common knowledge of a jury.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that *Saheli* is strictly limited to medical malpractice contexts involving clinical judgment, whereas Goldman Sachs cases often involve statutory violations (such as securities fraud or RICO) or fiduciary duties where the "standard of care" is defined by statute or industry regulations rather than medical expertise. Furthermore, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged misconduct involves clear breaches of written contracts or obvious regulatory violations, they may argue that the case does not require expert testimony on the standard of care, thereby rendering the *Saheli* requirement inapplicable to the specific legal theories asserted in *Crawford*.

Holding: In *State of New York v. Green*, 96 N.Y.2d 403 (2001), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant's failure to object to a jury instruction on the specific element of "intent" at trial constitutes a waiver of that issue, thereby precluding appellate review unless the error is deemed a "fundamental defect" affecting the fairness of the trial.

Argument: The defendant in *Crawford* likely cites this case to argue that Marla Crawford waived any procedural or substantive objections regarding specific legal standards or jury instructions by failing to raise them contemporaneously during the proceedings, or conversely, to demonstrate that because no such fundamental defect exists, the lower court's rulings must stand despite any alleged errors.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by arguing that *Green* applies strictly to criminal law and jury instruction waivers, whereas *Crawford* is a civil securities fraud action where different standards for preserving issues apply under CPLR rules. Furthermore, if the alleged error involves a question of law regarding the interpretation of federal securities statutes rather than a factual jury instruction, the "fundamental defect" exception from *Green* may not be triggered, rendering the waiver argument inapplicable to the core merits of the securities claim.

Holding: In *EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.*, the Supreme Court held that an employee's agreement to arbitrate employment disputes does not bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from seeking victim-specific relief, such as back pay and reinstatement, in its own enforcement action under Title VII.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that because the EEOC retains independent authority to seek relief even when an arbitration clause exists, the plaintiff's individual claim for similar relief (or the court's ability to award it) should similarly survive or be unaffected by any procedural bars or arbitration agreements that might otherwise apply to Crawford's specific claims. Alternatively, they may be using the citation to suggest that statutory enforcement mechanisms are robust and can proceed regardless of private contractual limitations, thereby supporting a broader interpretation of available remedies.

Counter: The opposing side would argue that *Waffle House* is fundamentally distinguishable because it involved a federal agency (the EEOC) exercising its sovereign enforcement powers, whereas Crawford is a private litigant seeking to enforce her own rights through a private lawsuit. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently held that private arbitration agreements are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), meaning Crawford cannot bypass her own arbitration agreement simply because the government could have done so; the "victim-specific relief" exception in *Waffle House* applies strictly to the EEOC's unique statutory role, not to individual plaintiffs bound by valid arbitration clauses.

Holding: *Ayzenberg v. Bronx House Emanuel Campus, Inc.* (2012) affirmed a summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff's negligence and breach of contract claims against a nursing home, ruling that the facility had no duty to prevent a resident from wandering off and dying because the specific risk was not foreseeable under the circumstances and the facility had complied with its contractual obligations.

Argument: The defendant in *Crawford* likely cites *Ayzenberg* to support an argument that the employer (Goldman Sachs) or related entities owed no legal duty to prevent harm or liability for events occurring outside the scope of employment or control, or to argue that the plaintiff failed to establish a foreseeable risk that would trigger a duty of care, thereby seeking dismissal on similar grounds of lack of duty or foreseeability.

Counter: The opposing side could distinguish this citation by noting that *Ayzenberg* involved a specialized custodial relationship between a nursing home and a vulnerable resident, whereas *Crawford* involves an employment context where the duties of care are governed by different statutory frameworks and common law principles regarding workplace safety and harassment. Furthermore, if *Crawford* involves allegations of intentional misconduct or systemic discrimination rather than simple negligence, the "no duty" rationale based on unforeseeability in *Ayzenberg* is inapplicable, as employers generally have a non-delegable duty to provide a safe work environment free from known hazards.

Holding: In *EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.*, the Supreme Court held that an employee's agreement to arbitrate employment disputes does not prevent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from seeking victim-specific relief, such as back pay and reinstatement, in its own enforcement action under Title VII.

Argument: The defendant is likely arguing that because the EEOC retains the authority to seek specific relief despite an arbitration clause, the plaintiff (Marla Crawford) similarly retains the right to pursue her individual claims for damages or equitable relief in court, regardless of any mandatory arbitration agreement she may have signed with Goldman Sachs.

Counter: The opposing side can distinguish this case by noting that *Waffle House* specifically addressed the statutory powers of a federal agency (the EEOC) acting in the public interest to enforce civil rights laws, whereas Crawford is a private litigant seeking to enforce her own private contractual rights. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled in cases like *Gilmer* and *14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett* that private individuals are generally bound by valid arbitration agreements, meaning the exception carved out for the EEOC does not extend to private plaintiffs attempting to bypass their own arbitration clauses.

Holding: The cited case, *John Tipaldo v. Christopher Lynn*, 26 N.Y.3d 212 (2015), is a misidentification; the actual case decided by the New York Court of Appeals on October 22, 2015, with that citation and those judges is *Crawford v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.*, which held that an employee's failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the New York State Human Rights Law bars a subsequent state court claim for discrimination based on the same facts.

Argument: The defendant side is likely arguing that Marla Crawford's state law claims are procedurally barred because she failed to timely file a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights or exhausted her administrative remedies before filing suit, relying on the precedent that such procedural failures preclude judicial relief.

Counter: The opposing side would immediately challenge this citation as a fatal error in legal research, noting that "John Tipaldo v. Christopher Lynn" does not exist as a 2015 NY Court of Appeals decision and that the citation provided (26 N.Y.3d 212) actually refers to the instant case itself (*Crawford v. Goldman Sachs*), not a separate authority. Furthermore, even if the defendant intended to cite the holding of *Crawford* regarding exhaustion, they cannot use the current case as binding precedent to dismiss itself; instead, they must rely on distinct prior case law establishing the exhaustion requirement, making this specific citation legally irrelevant and potentially damaging to the defendant's credibility.